The COVID-19 pandemic: resilient organisational response to a low-chance, high-impact event by Lloyd-Smith, M.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Lloyd-Smith, M. ORCID: 0000-0002-9907-9390 (2020). The COVID-19 
pandemic: resilient organisational response to a low-chance, high-impact event. BMJ 
Leader, doi: 10.1136/leader-2020-000245 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/24188/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/leader-2020-000245
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
Lloyd-Smith M. BMJ Leader 2020;0:1–4. doi:10.1136/leader-2020-000245 
Manuscript for submission to BMJ Leader 
 
Title: The COVID-19 pandemic: resilient organisational response to a low-chance, high-
impact event 
 
Author: McKenzie Lloyd-Smith 
 
Institution: Faculty of Management, Cass Business School, City, University of London 
Correspondence postal address: 106 Bunhill Row, London, UK, EC1Y 8TZ 
Correspondence email address: mckenzie.lloyd-smith@cass.city.ac.uk 
 
 
Word count: 2889 
 
 
Key words: resilience; improvisation; leadership; healthcare; hospitals. 
  
 2 
The COVID-19 pandemic: resilient organisational response to a low-
chance, high-impact event 
 
ABSTRACT 
The global healthcare sector is currently in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, a ’low-
chance, high-impact’ event which will require healthcare systems, and the organisations within 
them, to maintain organisational resilience in order to respond effectively. However, contrary 
to the instinctive reaction to tighten control, the quality of response depends on healthcare 
systems’ capacity to loosen control and, subsequently, enhance improvisation. Three factors 
critical to enhancing an organisation’s capacity for improvisation are highlighted; increasing 
autonomy, maintaining structure and creating a shared understanding. By drawing on the case 
of Christchurch Hospital’s response to a major earthquake, this paper demonstrates the vital 
role that improvisation can play within a clinical setting, when responding to a low-chance, 
high-impact event. 
INTRODUCTION 
At the time of writing, the cumulative global number of COVID-19 cases sits at 1 595 350, a 
growth of over 85 000 cases in a single day—the second largest yet—with no sign of growth 
abating soon.[1] Rather than routine emergencies, the global healthcare sector is currently 
dealing with a ‘low-chance, high-impact’ event.[2] One which creates an urgent threat to social 
and life-sustaining systems, creates deep uncertainty and requires international governmental 
intervention.[2] In order to respond effectively, healthcare systems and organisations within 
them need to ‘proactively adapt to and recover from’ this pandemic, which falls outside the 
range of expected disturbances; we call this ‘organisational resilience’.[3] However, in low-
chance, high-impact events, evidence suggests that plans often fail, communications falter and 
command-and-control systems do not work as expected.[2 4] Contrary to the natural reaction 
to tighten control in the face of such events, organisational resilience often depends on the 
ability of an organisation’s leadership to loosen control which,[5 6] in turn, increases the 
capacity for improvisation.[7] 
When responding to routine emergencies, rapid response benefits from hierarchical decision-
making and formal coordination with clear lines of authority and command.[8] In emergency 
medical care, as with firefighting and police response, these organisational features are pre-
existing and well used which allows for seamless rapid response to commonly faced 
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situations.[8] However, when low-chance, high-impact events occur, conditions change from 
routine to novel and represent a fundamental shift to an organisation’s environment.[9] In such 
circumstances, the context in which decisions are being made and action unfolds is often 
changing, unexpected and unforeseen. Thus, response requires flexibility, on-the-spot 
decision-making and informal coordination.[10] As conditions shift from routine to novel, such 
as those being experienced within healthcare systems responding to COVID-19, rigidly 
clinging onto pre-existing routines and control structures is likely to undermine resilience and 
backfire with tragic consequences.[9] Instead, organisations are required to creatively use 
existing resources, structures and processes, and enable their recombination to extend the range 
of alternative solutions to problems arising from the event.[9] 
Rather than attempting to provide a comprehensive review of resilience or improvisation,[3 
11] the focus of this paper is on highlighting the role that improvisation plays within resilience. 
I start by highlighting key findings regarding an organisation’s capacity for improvisation 
during the handling of low-chance, high-impact events. By drawing on the case of Christchurch 
Hospital’s response to a major earthquake, I show the vital role that improvisation can play 
within a clinical setting facing a novel and deeply uncertain situation. I subsequently review 
three enabling factors for increasing an organisation’s capacity for improvisation: increasing 
autonomy; maintaining structure, and; creating a shared understanding. I conclude with a brief 
discussion of the risks and challenges associated with improvisation. 
ORGANISATIONAL IMPROVISATION: CREATING ORDER FROM CHAOS 
Regardless of how well prepared an organisation is, it can never predict all potentialities, due 
to the cognitive limitations which stop us from anticipating all possible situations and 
consequences.[12] It would be impossible to anticipate and prepare for every event in advance 
and, therefore, unexpected situations will inevitably occur.[13] During such situations, 
including those induced by low-chance, high-impact events, the optimal deployment of 
resources is made difficult, if not impossible, as little or no time is available to allow for the 
conventional sequence of planning, formulating and implementing.[14] Organisational 
improvisation, defined as ‘the conception of action as it unfolds, by an organisation and/or its 
members, drawing on available material, cognitive, affective and social resources’,[7] occurs 
when this conventional sequence is replaced by cognition and action occurring 
simultaneously.[15] Improvisation is a creative act, at the intersection of intuition and 
spontaneity.[15] Individuals who successfully improvise remain creative under pressure by 
pulling order out of chaotic conditions, so that, when a novel situation occurs which renders 
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existing operating procedures and control structures inadequate, the improvisor is able to 
replace traditional order with an improvised one.[16] If resilience is embodied in making do 
with the resources you have to recover from larger than expected disturbances, which are 
neither fully controlled nor completely understood,[17] improvisation is the spontaneous and 
creative act of finding solutions.[12] In contrast, refusing to make decisions in the absence of 
complete and accurate information, or attempting to optimise resources before deployment will 
inevitably lead to avoidable failure.[2] This ability to creatively respond within uncertain 
conditions makes improvisation during a low-chance, high-impact event not only possible, but 
critically important for a resilient organisational response.[12] 
Take the example of New Zealand’s Christchurch Hospital which, on 22 February 2011, was 
struck by a magnitude 6.3 earthquake, causing damage which led to a 16% loss of total in-
patient capacity.[18] The acute medical wards were not structurally damaged but their function 
was compromised by water leaks and loss of utilities, including communications, water and 
electricity.[19] Ongoing seismic activity meant staff were unable to stand unsupported,[18 20] 
yet the acute ward staff maintained their responsibility of providing patient care, while 
attempting to make the immediate environment safe by identifying and reporting damage.18 
Ground tremors continued for days and utilities failed for weeks.[19] In this low-chance, high-
impact event, had the clinical team waited for the reinstatement of traditional order, or complete 
information about the situation—thereby allowing them to follow their standard operating 
procedures— patients would have received delayed care, potentially resulting in suffering or 
death.[21] Instead, the team abandoned traditional order, rapidly constituted a new situation, 
and improvised solutions to ensure the safety and uninterrupted care of patients. 
Subsequent to the immediate response, a decision was made to evacuate patients and 
permanently close the three acute medical wards.[18] Within 1 week of the earthquake, a new 
ward was to be created in a nearby hospital and patients relocated. The hospital to which the 
acute wards were to be relocated did not have an acute-admitting facility nor emergency 
department services.[22] This meant that the team faced complex problems while establishing 
a fully viable acute ward, including a lack of proper infrastructure and the inability to maintain 
existing operational procedures, while the split of acute services across two hospitals posed 
additional risk to patient safety by potentially limiting continuity of care and disrupting the 
existing model of care delivery.[18] To sustain uninterrupted acute care the team adopted 
creative and critical thinking, developing workarounds to overcome hindrances,[23] and 
gradually incorporated these workarounds into daily operations.[18] Infrastructure was quickly 
 5 
installed, new operational procedures established, policies modified, technology adopted and 
a new model of care delivery implemented almost immediately. The acute medical team had 
no training in responding to this type of low-chance, high-impact event, yet rapidly responded 
to the situation without the benefit of prior planning.[18] 
The present challenge for clinical leaders in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic is to loosen 
control, in order to increase organisational capacity for improvisation. However, this loosening 
of control is counterintuitive within the healthcare context, in which resilience is traditionally 
synonymous with enforcing compliance, increasing bureaucratic constraints and reducing 
procedural deviations.[24 25] Evidence shows, however, that improvisation neither requires 
nor benefits from anarchical organisation.[26] Instead, research reveals that improvisations are 
already successfully used within clinical settings, especially those characterised by uncertainty, 
such as trauma units.[21] This paper subsequently introduces three factors which are critical to 
enhancing an organisation’s capacity for improvisation; autonomy, structure and shared 
understanding. The role played by each factor is analysed within the case of Christchurch 
Hospital to understand its importance in responding to a novel and deeply uncertain situation. 
ENABLING IMPROVISATION: INCREASING AUTONOMY 
While tight structuring, hierarchical decision-making and formal coordination are important 
for rapid organising and efficient functioning in routine conditions,8 these become increasingly 
vulnerable as conditions shift from routine to uncertain, often becoming entirely inappropriate 
in novel conditions.[27] The first phase of a low-chance, high-impact event is inevitably 
marked by novelty, caused by a lack of information, communication and coordination.[2] In 
such circumstances, it would be impossible  to control every action made at the operational 
level, such as front-line clinicians,[5] and attempts by leadership to do so would quickly result 
in a bottleneck in decision-making, slowing down response and impeding both flexibility and 
local initiative.[5] In addition, those in front-line roles are likely to know more about the current 
situation than those within more centralised roles, allowing them to take more appropriate 
action based on immediate needs.[28] The marginalisation of front-line staff during a low-
chance, high-impact event leads to an inefficient response and a suboptimal outcome.[28] In 
contrast, teams and organisations which consistently operate error-free in highly uncertain 
conditions display the tendency to push decision-making to the frontline,[8 29] to those with 
the most expertise and/or specific knowledge about the situation, regardless of rank or 
seniority.[17] By increasing autonomy and allowing decision rights to migrate, leaders 
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encourage improvisation by enabling front-line staff to act spontaneously, guided by intuition, 
which increases the likelihood that challenges will be overcome.[15 30] 
The migration of authority encourages faster response, and has been shown to be successful in 
clinical settings. For example, the Loma Linda University Children’s Hospital, California, 
operates a paediatric intensive care unit (PICU) that has been designed around this 
principle.[31] Due to the complexity and pace of change occurring within a PICU setting, the 
unit accommodates the likely scenario that decisions will have to be made without perfect 
information. Rather than relying on strict protocols and hierarchical decisions regarding patient 
care, decisions within the PICU are migrated down to the staff with the best knowledge of the 
situation, regardless of rank or seniority.[31] By designing for autonomy, clinical leaders 
enable flexibility and on-the-spot decision-making by those most informed, allowing front-line 
staff to deliver patient care more effectively,[31] and earning the hospital consistently high 
patient care results.[32] In the case of Christchurch Hospital, had front-line staff waited for 
instructions from clinical leaders, rather than acting immediately in the initial response to the 
earthquake, patients would have received delayed care. By acting autonomously, front-line 
staff relied on expertise, intuition and specific knowledge of their circumstances which 
generated faster, more informed decisions and thus a more resilient response.[17] 
ENABLING IMPROVISATION: MAINTAINING STRUCTURE 
The second enabling factor for improvisation is the maintenance of a structure with clear lines 
of communication and coordination. Despite the need for loosened control, improvisation 
neither requires, nor benefits from, total anarchy. Rather than materialising ‘out of thin air’,[26] 
improvisation comes from adjustments to, and recombinations of, already existing 
resources.[9] Continuing to maintain some structure provides a ‘common frame’ around which 
adjustments can occur.[14] To ensure autonomy is preserved, this structure may be absent of 
explicit rules, freeing up individuals to respond as required. But guidelines with a high degree 
of flexibility support creative adjustments, while helping strike a balance between control and 
autonomy.[33] Further, resilient response to low-chance, high-impact events requires 
collective behaviour rather than solo acts.[34] Maintaining structure supports collective 
behaviour by enabling coordination via communication.[10] Maintaining coordination while 
increasing autonomy actively enables front-line staff to improvise, by allowing individuals to 
effectively and continuously integrate their behaviours with others. As a result, an organisation 
is able to remain stable while becoming exceptionally flexible to the demands of the 
situation.[8] 
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Healthcare systems are in the advantageous position of being able to rely on pre-existing role 
structures, providing front-line staff with an expectation of how their behaviours will integrate 
with others.[35] Reflecting on Christchurch Hospital’s response to the earthquake, accounts 
highlight that self-organising behaviour, ‘out of the box’ thinking and problem-solving 
occurred between frontline clinical staff attempting to establish a fully viable acute medical 
ward in less than 1 week.[18] This rapid, autonomous response was underpinned by a 
coordination meeting between senior clinicians from different departments and the 
establishment of a hospital control room.[22] Members of different medical teams cooperated 
in a shared decision-making process which acted to coordinate activities based on existing 
roles, while debrief exercises were used to communicate new protocols and procedures.[18] 
By melding the existing role structure with autonomy-enhancing processes, Christchurch 
Hospital was able to enhance and sustain organisational resilience, enabling their effective 
response.[21] 
ENABLING IMPROVISATION: CREATING A SHARED UNDERSTANDING 
When tasks are complex and organisations large, such as those within healthcare systems, it is 
difficult for individuals to be fully aware of the interdependencies of their actions.[36] This is 
further exacerbated in highly demanding situations, such as low-chance, high-impact events, 
during which individuals may be unable  to maintain holistic awareness of the situation.[8] 
However, as we have already established, resilient organisational response requires collective 
behaviour rather than individual acts.[34] Therefore, creating a shared understanding of a 
situation helps teams improvise solutions to problems found within the complex and uncertain 
conditions produced by such events.[8] 
Traditionally created by plans, rules and familiarity, in novel situations a shared understanding 
is produced through direct information sharing.[37] The monitoring of activities and frequent 
updating of progress within groups allows interdependent tasks to be coordinated,[21] while 
liaising between groups allows for coordination across an organisation.[38] This timely sharing 
of information, supported by a structure, allows individuals to create and sustain a ‘big picture’ 
of the situation at any one moment.[30] While the initial phase of a low-chance, high-impact 
event is often characterised by failure of communication,[2 4] the subsequent establishment of 
a shared understanding of the situation enables front-line operators to remain sensitive to 
operations, and aware of how their decisions and actions potentially impact others;[39] a vital 
process in uncertain and rapidly changing conditions.[10] Further, by creating a shared 
understanding of the situation, individuals become aware of how their efforts fit together with 
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others to achieve the desired outcome.[37] In contrast, a lack of shared understanding has been 
shown to produce less effective responses to such events.[28] 
In the aftermath of the 2011 earthquake, Christchurch Hospital’s communication systems 
ceased to function due to the main power and backup generators failing.[22] The hospital 
received little information about the impact of the earthquake, leaving them unable to predict 
the number of casualties or when they would arrive.[22] However, a shared understanding of 
the situation was quickly enabled by the provision of communication technologies including 
radiotelephones and mobile phones to key staff, while direct information sharing occurred via 
a loudspeaker system which communicated updates.[22] This development of shared 
understanding was supported by the senior clinician coordination meeting.[22] By creating a 
shared understanding of the unfolding situation and facilitating communication throughout the 
response, Christchurch Hospital’s leadership enabled front-line staff to coordinate under novel 
circumstances,[21] allowing individuals to improvise solutions to problems and understand 
how their actions and decisions were embedded within a larger operation.[35] 
RESILIENT RESPONSE: SACRIFICING OPTIMISATION 
When responding to low-chance, high-impact events, organisations are forced to cope with 
novel situations which are likely to be both unexpected and deeply uncertain.[2] Resilience 
will be necessary for organisations to cope with, and recover from, such disturbances.[9] Due 
to the non-routine nature of such circumstances, existing routines and processes will no longer 
apply, as unvarying practices cannot handle what they do not anticipate.[30] The rapid response 
required for handling low-chance, high-impact events forces the conventional sequence of 
planning, formulating and implementing to be supplanted by the simultaneous occurrence of 
cognition and action, resulting in organisational improvisation.[14 15] By replacing traditional 
order with an improvised one, an organisation increases its chances of recovering from a larger 
than expected disturbance, which  is neither fully controlled nor completely understood.[5 16] 
There is, however, variability in both ‘the quality of improvisational action and its suitability 
under various conditions’ and, therefore, the potential negative implications of improvisation 
are worth acknowledging.[15] 
By adopting improvisation, an organisation is unable to centrally control the use of resources, 
and therefore deploy them optimally; potentially leading to their inefficient or ineffective 
use.[7 14] In addition, improvisations are inherently unpredictable, and one aimed at solving a 
problem could accidentally escalate it.[40] This can lead to the creation of a ‘spiral of 
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complexity’ in which an improvisation to overcome one problem creates another unexpected 
problem, requiring further improvisation and leading to an escalating lack of control.[7] Most 
importantly for a clinical setting, improvisations should only be undertaken, and supported, on 
the condition that they fit with the organisational goals and are unlikely to cause harm to 
patients or staff.[8] 
Despite the potential disadvantages of enabling improvisation, the alternative is the 
maintenance of organisational rigidity. During a low-chance, high-impact event, mandating 
adherence to inflexible protocols, refusing to make or allow decisions in the absence of 
complete information, or attempting to optimise resources before deployment, will inevitably 
lead to avoidable failure.[5] 
CONCLUSION: RESILIENT ORGANISATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE COVID-19 
PANDEMIC 
The COVID-19 pandemic can be considered a low-chance, high-impact event.[2] One which 
has caused urgent threat to life, created global conditions of deep uncertainty, and requires 
resilient response from healthcare systems and the organisations within them.[3] However, 
while hierarchical decision-making and tight control is important for efficient functioning in 
routine conditions,[8] these become inappropriate in the novel conditions currently being 
faced.[27] Therefore, contrary to the instinctive reaction to tighten control, the resilience of 
healthcare systems depends on the flexibility enabled by loosening control.[5 6] In these novel 
circumstances, maintaining existing routines and processes is likely to backfire,[9] as the order 
they wish to maintain no longer exists.[16] Instead, the construction of a new order is required, 
by creatively utilising existing resources, structures and processes, and enabling their 
recombination.[9] Without the benefit of time, preparation is superseded by improvisation.[15] 
By increasing autonomy, maintaining structure and creating a shared understanding of the 
situation, clinical leaders are able to increase their organisation’s capacity for improvisation. 
When these three factors are embraced, as they were within Christchurch Hospital’s response 
to a major earthquake, an organisation is able to respond rapidly and flexibly to the new 
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